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In	2015,	community	event–based	surveillance	(CEBS)	was	
implemented	in	Sierra	Leone	to	assist	with	the	detection	of	
Ebola	virus	disease	(EVD)	cases.	We	assessed	the	sensi-
tivity	of	CEBS	for	finding	EVD	cases	during	a	7-month	pe-
riod,	and	in	a	6-week	subanalysis,	we	assessed	the	timeli-
ness	of	reporting	cases	with	no	known	epidemiologic	links	
at	time	of	detection.	Of	the	12,126	CEBS	reports,	287	(2%)	
met	the	suspected	case	definition,	and	16	were	confirmed	
positive.	 CEBS	 detected	 30%	 (16/53)	 of	 the	 EVD	 cases	
identified	during	 the	study	period.	During	 the	subanalysis,	
CEBS	 staff	 identified	 4	 of	 6	 cases	with	 no	 epidemiologic	
links.	 These	 CEBS-detected	 cases	 were	 identified	 more	
rapidly	than	those	detected	by	the	national	surveillance	sys-
tem;	 however,	 too	 few	 cases	were	detected	 to	 determine	
system	timeliness.	Although	CEBS	detected	EVD	cases,	it	
largely	generated	false	alerts.	Future	versions	of	communi-
ty-based	surveillance	could	improve	case	detection	through	
increased	staff	training	and	community	engagement.
Community event–based surveillance (CEBS) systems have been used for case finding during outbreaks and 
to increase sensitivity for detection of diseases targeted 
for eradication (1–5), but this type of surveillance has not 
been implemented rapidly on a national scale during a large 
health emergency. In October 2014, near the peak of the 
Ebola virus disease (EVD) epidemic in West Africa, the In-
ternational Rescue Committee, Sierra Leone’s Bo District 
Health Management Team, and the US Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention developed CEBS in Sierra Leone 
to serve as a village-level active surveillance system for 
reporting possible EVD cases (6). At that time, many in-
fected persons were not detected until after they had died 
by the national surveillance system, which consisted of 
contact tracing, healthcare facility surveillance, and a tele-
phone hotline for reporting events; thus, opportunities for 
virus transmission were prolonged (6). CEBS was designed 
to supplement the national surveillance system by training 
community members to identify, within their own commu-
nities, unsafe burials and persons with signs and symptoms 
compatible with EVD infection. Through its community 
presence, CEBS was positioned to detect EVD cases that 
were not epidemiologically linked to other confirmed cases 
at the time of detection; identification of such cases could 
provide early warning of new chains of transmission.
A brief pilot study in Bo District during November 
and December 2014 demonstrated that community leader-
ship accepted CEBS and that CEBS could identify possible 
EVD cases. Thus, the Ebola Response Consortium, led by 
the International Rescue Committee and consisting of 15 
humanitarian organizations committed to stopping the Eb-
ola virus epidemic, worked with the Sierra Leone Ministry 
of Health and Sanitation to implement CEBS in 9 of Sierra 
Leone’s 14 districts (Figure 1). CEBS began operations on 
February 27, 2015, when the surveillance system recorded 
its first alert.
During February 27–September 30, 2015, we evalu-
ated the ability of CEBS to detect possible EVD cases and 
unsafe burials in the 9 districts. We also conducted a sub-
analysis of the system during its first 6 weeks of operation 
in Kambia District to assess the sensitivity, positive pre-
dictive value (PPV), and timeliness of case detection for 
persons with no epidemiologic links at the time of detec-
tion. Among the districts in which CEBS was operational, 
Kambia District was the only one that experienced ongoing 
active virus transmission during the subanalysis period.
Methods
Data Collection, Data Flow, and Reporting
The CEBS system included community health monitors, 
community surveillance supervisors, and community 
health officers, each of whom received job-specific train-
ing in the month before beginning operations. Formal 
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evaluations of staff knowledge were not conducted due to 
the rapid nature of the system deployment, but some dis-
tricts provided informal refresher training when possible. 
Community health monitors were volunteers or existing 
community health workers who were trained to detect 6 
trigger events suggestive of Ebola virus transmission: 1) 
>2 sick or dead members in a household, 2) a sick or dead 
person after an unsafe burial or corpse washing, 3) a sick 
or dead health worker or traditional healer, 4) a sick or 
dead traveler, 5) a sick or dead contact of an EVD pa-
tient, or 6) an unsafe burial or corpse washing. A seventh 
category, “other,” was included so that community health 
monitors could report and describe other unusual events 
that did not fall under any of the 6 defined trigger events. 
Community health monitors reported events to their com-
munity surveillance supervisors via mobile telephone 
calls; the supervisors then conducted preliminary investi-
gations. The community health officers, who were trained 
professionals within the national public health system, 
often assisted surveillance supervisors with preliminary 
investigations, but some delegated that responsibility to 
the supervisors and only assisted when needed. The sur-
veillance supervisors or community health officers then 
reported events that remained suspect to their local Dis-
trict Ebola Response Center for follow-up.
Community health monitors were responsible for their 
own village and sometimes, to help ensure adequate cover-
age, a few small villages within walking distance of where 
they lived. Surveillance supervisors were assigned a larger 
area but were provided with motorcycles to facilitate inves-
tigations. All CEBS staff were given a mobile telephone 
with monthly phone credit or a subscription in a prepaid, 
closed user-group network. Community health monitors 
were expected to immediately contact their surveillance 
supervisors to report alerts and to contact them weekly to 
confirm the absence of reportable events.
When a surveillance supervisor received an alert from 
a community health monitor, the supervisor recorded the 
alert information on a standardized form, a weekly alert 
log. The following data were captured: date; time; trigger 
event involved; type of alert (sickness, death, unsafe burial, 
or other); and age, sex, and location of the person(s) con-
cerned. The surveillance supervisor also recorded what, if 
any, actions were taken to respond to the alert; whether the 
alert was raised to the District Ebola Response Center; and 
whether local social mobilization teams were notified to 
provide health education activities.
Surveillance supervisors submitted alert logs to the 
CEBS district lead at the end of each week. On a weekly 
basis, the district lead entered the data into a standardized 
spreadsheet, checked for duplicate reporting, and submit-
ted the document to the CEBS coordination unit in Free-
town, Sierra Leone. The district lead also cross-checked 
each CEBS alert against those in the District Ebola Re-
sponse Center alert records and confirmed the final alert 
status as 1) the identified illness or death did not meet the 
suspected case definition, 2) the alert involved a suspected 
or probable case-patient who tested negative, or 3) the alert 
identified a confirmed case. In Sierra Leone, a suspected 
case-patient was defined as 1) a person with a fever (tem-
perature >38°C) who was a known contact of a suspected, 
probable, or confirmed EVD clinical case-patient; 2) a per-
son with >3 EVD-compatible symptoms (e.g., headache, 
vomiting, and diarrhea) and who had had contact with a 
clinical case-patient; 3) a person with fever and >3 EVD-
compatible symptoms; 4) a person with inexplicable bleed-
ing or miscarriage; or 5) a deceased person with an unex-
plained death. A probable EVD case-patient was defined as 
a person who was determined likely to have EVD based on 
clinical or epidemiologic factors. A confirmed case-patient 
was defined as a person who tested positive for Ebola virus 
RNA by quantitative reverse transcription PCR or a similar 
diagnostic test (7).
By September 30, 2015, CEBS had been implemented 
by 7,416 community health monitors and 137 surveillance 
supervisors across 9 districts in Sierra Leone (Figure 1). 
Implementation was undertaken by the International Res-
cue Committee (in Bo, Kenema, Kono, and Tonkolili Dis-
tricts); Save the Children International (in Kailahun and 
Pujehun Districts); CARE International (in Bombali Dis-
trict); Action contre la Faim (in Kambia and Moyamba Dis-
tricts); and ABC Development (in Kambia District). The 
Ebola Response Consortium provided technical assistance 
for system implementation and operations.
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Figure 1.	Nine	districts	(dark	gray	shading)	where	community	
event–based	surveillance	for	Ebola	virus	disease	was	operational,	
Sierra	Leone,	February	27–September	30,	2015.
Surveillance	for	Ebola	Virus	Disease
As a new surveillance system, CEBS had no trained 
staff, field equipment (e.g., telephones and motorbikes), or 
reporting infrastructure. The startup costs were estimated 
at US$1.3 million. Once the system was operational, the 
monthly costs were ≈US$129,000, which covered training, 
telephones, motorbikes, fuel, and incentives.
Methods of Evaluation
We described the alerts by type (illness, death, unsafe 
burial, and other) and by trigger event used. We calcu-
lated alert rates and death rates per 100,000 persons per 
day by district, using 2004 district population estimates 
(8). The sensitivity of CEBS for case detection was as-
sessed using the Ministry of Health and Sanitation’s sur-
veillance data (9). Sensitivity was evaluated by dividing 
the number of CEBS-detected confirmed cases by the total 
number of confirmed cases detected by the overall surveil-
lance system. PPV of confirmed case detection was deter-
mined by dividing the confirmed cases detected by CEBS 
by the suspected, probable, and confirmed cases detected 
by CEBS.
During April 13–May 30, 2015 (i.e., from the date 
CEBS first became operational in Kambia to the end date 
of our team’s field investigations), we evaluated cases 
in persons in Kambia District who had no identified epi-
demiologic links at the time of detection. We used the 
Ministry of Health and Sanitation’s Epi Info database to 
identify all confirmed cases in Kambia during the evalu-
ation period (10). The database served as the line list of 
suspected, probable, and confirmed cases in Sierra Leone 
and integrated information from the epidemiologic inves-
tigation, including date of symptom onset and potential 
risk factors. By interviewing frontline public health and 
CEBS staff, we were able to determine whether and how 
CEBS was involved in case detection. We considered 
case-patients to have no identified epidemiologic links at 
the time of detection if they were not on the contact list 
used by the district contact tracers and, therefore, were 
not being actively monitored. The timeliness of detection 
of these cases was determined by calculating the interval 
in days between the date of symptom onset and the date 
of detection.
This assessment was a part of a nonresearch public 
health response activity and thus did not undergo institu-
tional review board review. In addition, we used only infor-
mation that had already been collected for public health sur-
veillance purposes, so informed consent was not obtained.
Results
During February 27–September 30, 2015, a total of 12,126 
alerts were reported through CEBS in 9 Sierra Leone dis-
tricts (Figure 2). Tonkolili was the first district to report on 
a consistent basis, beginning on February 27, followed by 
Moyamba (March 6), Pujehun (March 14), Kenema (March 
31), Kambia (April 13), Bo (April 18), Kono (April 23), 
Bombali (April 27), and Kailahun (June 14). From June 14 
onward, the districts were collectively reporting an average 
of 79 alerts per day.
Of the 12,126 alerts reported, 86% (10,421) were 
for deaths, 14% (1,646) for illnesses, and <1% for un-
safe burials (7) or other (52) (Table 1). The alert rate per 
100,000 persons per day differed by district and alert 
type. Of note, Moyamba and Kambia generated the high-
est rates of death alerts (3.81 and 2.19, respectively), and 
Kailahun and Bombali reported the highest rates of sick 
alerts (0.67 and 0.32, respectively) (Table 2). The CEBS 
death reporting rates were substantially lower than the 
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Figure 2.	Weekly	alerts	from	community	event–based	surveillance	
for	Ebola	virus	disease,	by	district,	Sierra	Leone,	February	27–
September	30,	2015.
 
 
 
Table 1. CEBS	for	Ebola	virus	disease,	Sierra	Leone,	2015* 
Surveillance	variable No.	(%) 
Alerts,	n	=	12,126  
 Death 10,421	(86) 
 Sickness 1,646	(14) 
 Unsafe	burial 7	(<1) 
 Other† 52	(<1) 
Trigger	events  
 >2	persons	sick	or	dead	in	household 205	(2) 
 Sickness	or	death	after	unsafe	burial 59	(<1) 
 Sickness	or	death	in	HCW 70	(<1) 
 Sickness	or	death	in	traveler 191	(2) 
 Sickness	or	death	in	contact	of	case-patient 36	(<1) 
 Unsafe	burial	or	washing	of	corpse 7	(<1) 
 Other‡ 11,558	(95) 
Cases  
 Suspected, probable,	or	confirmed 287	(2) 
  Tested	and	ruled	negative 271	 
  Confirmed 16	 
 Did	not	meet	case	definition 10,173	(84) 
 Not	escalated	as	an	alert 774	(6) 
 Lost	to	follow-up§ 892	(7) 
*This	analysis	was	conducted	during	February	27–September	30,	2015.	
CEBS,	community	event–based	surveillance;	HCW,	healthcare	worker. 
†Alerts	for	unusual	events	that	did	not	fall	under	any	of	the	first	6	events	
listed	in	the	trigger	events	section	of	the	table. 
‡A	total	of	10,042	(86.9%)	of	these	events	were	deaths	in	the	community. 
§No	follow-up	or	missing	information	on	follow-up. 
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expected crude death rate of 4.66 deaths/100,000 persons/
day used by the World Health Organization (11).
In terms of the 6 defined trigger events, the most 
commonly cited was >2 sick or dead household mem-
bers (n = 205, 2%). Sickness or death of a traveler was 
the second most cited (n = 191, 2%). In total, the 6 de-
fined trigger events accounted for <5% of the alerts (Ta-
ble 1). The seventh trigger event category (i.e., other) 
accounted for the most alerts (n = 11,558, 95%); a total 
of 10,042 (87%) of the alerts categorized as other were 
for deaths in the community (Table 1). Surveillance su-
pervisors and community health officers escalated 93% 
of the alerts to the District Ebola Response Centers for 
follow-up.
A total of 287 (2%) of all persons who triggered 
alerts met the suspected, probable, or confirmed case defi-
nitions. Of these 287 persons, 215 (75%) were detected 
after death, and 271 (94%) tested negative for EVD. Dur-
ing the study period, 16 confirmed EVD cases were re-
ported by CEBS in Kambia (n = 13) and Tonkolili (n = 
3); half of the infected persons were detected while alive. 
During this same period, the Ministry of Health and Sani-
tation documented 53 confirmed cases in the CEBS dis-
tricts. Overall, the sensitivity for confirmed case detection 
by CEBS was 30% (16/53 confirmed cases), and the PPV 
was 6% (16/287 suspected, probable, or confirmed cases). 
Sensitivity was 27% (13/49 confirmed cases) in Kambia 
and 75% (3/4 confirmed cases) in Tonkolili; PPV was 7% 
(13/175 suspected, probable, or confirmed cases) in Kam-
bia and 9% (3/33 suspected, probable, or confirmed cases) 
in Tonkolili.
During the 6-week subanalysis in Kambia, the Min-
istry of Health and Sanitation database identified 13 con-
firmed EVD cases in the district. CEBS staff reported 8 
of these patients, of whom 7 were alive at the time of the 
alert. Upon further investigation, we found that 3 of the 
cases were reported by community health monitors who 
also served as contact tracers through the contact trac-
ing reporting system. Therefore, CEBS was not the main 
reporting source for these 3 cases, and the cases were 
not recorded in the CEBS database or counted as cases 
detected by CEBS. For the remaining 5 cases, 3 were 
classified as other trigger events, 1 was in a sick contact 
of a confirmed case-patient, and 1 was a sick member of 
a household.
Six of the 13 confirmed case-patients in Kambia had 
no epidemiologic links when they were detected; CEBS 
staff identified 4 of these case-patients. The time from 
symptom onset to detection ranged from 1 to 3 days for 
the 4 cases identified by CEBS and was 5 and 7 days, re-
spectively, for the 2 cases detected by other components 
of the national surveillance system (Table 3). For the lat-
ter 2 cases, 1 of the ill persons lived in a village that was 
not covered by a community health monitor at the time of 
detection, and the case was identified after the person had 
died; the other person resided in a CEBS-covered village, 
but the case was not detected until the ill person was ad-
mitted to a local hospital.
During the subanalysis in Kambia, surveillance staff 
from other districts indicated that the CEBS network had 
detected additional outbreaks that were not caused by 
Ebola. Community health monitors identified 2 measles 
clusters in Kono and 1 measles cluster in Bombali, lead-
ing to the initiation of investigations and implementation 
of control measures, including isolation of ill persons and 
vaccination of susceptible children. Community health 
monitors in Bombali and Kono also reported suspected 
chickenpox clusters.
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Table 2. CEBS	Ebola	virus	disease alert	rates, by	type	and	district,	Sierra	Leone,	February	27–September	30,	2015* 
District 
Population	
estimate† 
Days	of	CEBS	
operation 
Death	alerts  Sick	alerts 
Total	no.	alerts Rate‡ Total	no.	alerts Rate‡ 
Moyamba 278,119 208 2,203 3.81  74 0.13 
Bombali 494,139 156 1,137 1.47  250 0.32 
Kambia 341,690 170 1,273 2.19  148 0.25 
Bo 654,142 165 1,775 1.64  238 0.22 
Tonkolili 434,937 215 1,343 1.44  192 0.21 
Kenema 653,013 183 1,327 1.11  308 0.26 
Kono 325,003 160 573 1.10  48 0.09 
Pujehun 335,574 200 432 0.64  108 0.16 
Kailahun 465,048 108 358 0.71  339 0.67 
*CEBS	(community	event–based surveillance) was conducted in 9 of the country’s 14 districts. 
†Estimates	from	the	2004	Population	and	Housing	Census:	Analytical	Report	on	Population	Projection	for	Sierra	Leone	(8). 
‡No.	alerts/100,000	persons/d. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Timeliness	of	identification	of	confirmed	Ebola	virus	
disease	cases	with	no	known	epidemiologic	links	to	other	
confirmed	cases	at	detection,	Kambia District,	Sierra	Leone,	
2015* 
Detected	
by	CEBS 
Patient	
age,	y/sex 
Symptom	
onset	date 
Detection 
date 
Days	from	
onset to 
detection 
Yes 52/M Apr	17 Apr	20 3 
No 45/M Apr	17 Apr	22 5 
Yes 23/F Apr	23 Apr	25 2 
Yes 25/F Apr	24 Apr	27 3 
No 56/F Apr	23 Apr	30 7 
Yes 29/M May	28 May	29 1 
*The	data	are	for	April	13–May	30,	2015.	CEBS,	community	event–based	
surveillance. 
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Discussion
Our evaluation indicates that, during its period of opera-
tion, CEBS effectively generated alerts for and detected 
nearly one third of all EVD cases found in its districts. 
Although this would rightly be considered a low sensi-
tivity for an independent surveillance system, CEBS was 
designed to supplement a larger, established system. The 
low PPV of CEBS also was expected because of the ten-
dency of event-based systems to provide higher sensitiv-
ity while generating a large number of false alerts (12) 
and because there were few true EVD cases. Ruling out 
EVD in times of low transmission requires investiga-
tion of all alerts and isolation and testing of all suspected 
case-patients (13), most of whom will be determined to 
be uninfected.
Our data from the subanalysis in Kambia are too few to 
draw a meaningful conclusion, but they suggest that CEBS 
may be capable of quickly finding cases with no identi-
fied epidemiologic links. If this is true, the system could 
be used to detect the early stages of new infectious disease 
outbreaks or to rapidly identify the spread of disease to 
new geographic areas during ongoing outbreaks or epidem-
ics. Nevertheless, even within this small sample of cases, 
CEBS failed to detect 2 cases with no known epidemiolog-
ic links, which highlights the need for adequate coverage 
of villages by community health monitors, development of 
stronger links between communities and health monitors, 
and vigilance by the monitors.
One unexpected finding was that CEBS detected a large 
number of deaths in the community. Although not intended 
to serve as a reporting system for community deaths, CEBS 
did contribute to death reporting, which was a major ini-
tiative of the national government and social mobilization 
programs. By detecting dead bodies that were then tested 
and found to be negative for Ebola infection, CEBS helped 
to confirm the lack of virus transmission, thereby providing 
some evidence that the epidemic had, in fact, ended in a 
given district. However, death reports are a late indicator of 
infection and, thus, do not enable isolation of patients early 
in the disease course, a control measure that could result 
in reduced transmission (14–16). The death reporting rates 
also were considerably lower in most CEBS districts than 
would be expected based on estimated death rates (11); 
consequently, CEBS reporting rates were not a substitute 
for death surveillance or registration.
Another unexpected finding was the detection of 3 
measles outbreaks. Given extensive undervaccination 
and undertreatment of other communicable diseases dur-
ing the epidemic, it was expected that a large number of 
disease outbreaks would go undetected (17,18), but we 
did not anticipate that CEBS would detect a few of them. 
CEBS staff might have detected these clusters because 
some of the trigger events, such as >2 sick or dead persons 
in a household, were not specific to EVD. The staff also 
might have identified the clusters because they were look-
ing for signs of illness in their communities, irrespective 
of the cause or signs or symptoms. This finding provides 
some indication that community-based surveillance could 
be used to provide early warning of a variety of diseases 
of public health concern.
Our evaluation also revealed several critical weak-
nesses in CEBS, some of which may be due to the rapid 
implementation of the system. First, community health 
monitors primarily relied on the trigger category other 
to classify community deaths and alerts, rather than the 
defined trigger events that they were taught to seek out. 
This lack of use of defined trigger events could imply that 
some of the triggers were not sensitive enough to cap-
ture Ebola virus transmission. It is also possible that the 
staff miscategorized the alerts and that many alerts did, 
in fact, fit a trigger event category. However, most alerts 
categorized as other were not reported with sufficient in-
formation to assess whether they fit a defined trigger event 
category. Before future systems are widely implemented, 
the validity of triggers should be more rigorously tested, 
and refresher training of staff should be regularly pro-
vided to reinforce trigger event recall. Rapid implemen-
tation at scale is difficult to achieve while also provid-
ing comprehensive training and developing strong links 
between the community and the surveillance team. Ide-
ally, community-based surveillance should be developed 
and implemented when a large outbreak is not underway. 
Such a system would then be in place and available for 
adaptation if a public health crisis arises.
Another weakness of CEBS is that community health 
monitors reported relatively few illnesses, which is con-
cerning for a system that aimed to detect illness quickly 
to reduce opportunities for virus transmission. The low 
proportion of illness alerts may indicate that the intended 
meaning of illness was unclear or, more likely, that com-
munity health monitors were concerned about negative 
consequences from the community for reporting an event, 
particularly if the affected person was not infected with 
Ebola virus.
A final weakness of note is that CEBS detected few un-
safe burials. This lack of reporting could reflect the general 
challenge faced by EVD surveillance in exposing a cultur-
al tradition that communities intentionally guard closely. 
However, by February 2015, when awareness of the Ebola 
virus transmission risks of traditional burials were more 
fully understood, community members may have bypassed 
their community health monitors to relay information about 
unsafe burials directly to the preexisting burial manage-
ment alert system (19).
Our evaluation has several limitations. First, we con-
ducted the evaluation during a period of low Ebola virus 
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transmission; therefore, we cannot draw conclusions 
about how CEBS would perform in a high-transmission 
environment. Second, the subanalysis in Kambia lasted 
only 6 weeks and involved only a few cases. Conse-
quently, the results regarding the ability of CEBS to find 
cases with no identified epidemiologic links at the time 
of detection cannot be considered conclusive. Additional 
implementation and evaluation of CEBS in future EVD 
outbreaks would provide data to assess the relative merits 
of this approach. Third, we could not analyze the sensitiv-
ity of CEBS to detect other disease outbreaks because no 
reference standard exists to inform the denominator, and 
no reporting mechanism exists within CEBS to inform the 
numerator. Fourth, CEBS was implemented primarily in 
rural settings, so we do not know how the system would 
perform in a densely populated urban setting, such as a 
capital city. Last, an anthropologic understanding of the 
lack of illness and burial reporting would inform a more 
comprehensive interpretation of these results.
The Sierra Leone Ministry of Health and Sanitation 
plans to use community-based surveillance as part of its 
Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response system, 
which is tasked with detecting and responding to several 
priority diseases, conditions, and events (20). Communi-
ty-based surveillance could extend disease surveillance 
beyond district health clinics to the village level and pro-
vide an early warning function. This would contribute to 
meeting the core capacity requirements of the Internation-
al Health Regulations to detect and report disease at the 
community level to facilitate the immediate implementa-
tion of control measures before an outbreak expands fur-
ther (21,22). Nonetheless, our evaluation reveals several 
challenges that should be addressed. Detailed assessments 
should be undertaken to determine how community health 
monitors recognize and categorize symptomatic illness 
and the barriers to their ability and willingness to report 
illness. The assessment results should then be applied to 
refine trigger definitions and processes. Given that valid 
disease measures are the basis of an effective surveillance 
system, these issues are the most pressing ones that need 
to be studied and addressed to strengthen future iterations 
of community-based surveillance. In addition, trigger def-
initions should remain simple to ensure that community 
health monitors can understand and correctly apply them, 
which may mean that a few salient, event-based triggers 
would be more effective than several case-based, specific 
triggers. Alternatively, more extensive, regularly repeated 
training of community health monitors might be needed to 
ensure adequate recall and reporting of more complicat-
ed triggers. Furthermore, to sustain efficacy and perfor-
mance, community-based surveillance must be fully inte-
grated into the overall surveillance system and adequately 
supported to ensure response capacity.
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